

IMPRIMATUR.

A NEW

Political Catechism,

Price One Shilling.

IMPRIMATUR.

I*T is this Twentieth Day of May ORDERED*
by the COMMITTEE of the House of Com-
mons, in Parliament, concerning Printing,
that this Book, entituled, A POLITICAL
CATECHISM, be printed.

JOHN WHITE.

1643.

*What once fell out in Forty-Three,
Great-Britain's Lot again may be !*

ANGLICUS.

A NEW
Political Catechism
FOR THE
PRESENT TIMES.

Very proper to be learned by every

BRITISH SUBJECT, *K*

Before HE be brought to be CONFIRM'D by
A MINISTER of STATE.

*The HEAVENS shall reveal their INIQUITIES, and the
Earth shall rise up AGAINST Them. J O B. XX. 27.*

To which is added,

Machiavel's **G H O S T:**
A
S A T I R E.

THE SECOND EDITION.

L O N D O N:

Printed to be bound up, for Universal Benefit, with *The
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Strand. M. DCC. XL.

A NEW
Political Catechism

FOR THE
PRESENT TIMES

BRITISH SUBJECT

By the Rev. John C. ...

ADMINISTRATOR OF STATE

48

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258

STATE





POLITICAL CATECHISM,

FOR THE

**Instructions of those who have
made the late Protestations con-
cerning the Power and Privi-
leges of Parliament.**

Question 1.



**OW many simple kinds
are there of Civil-Gov-
ernment of States,
and Commonwealths?**

Answer.

**There are three kinds of Gov-
ernment among Men ; Absolute**

B

Monar

Monarchy, Aristocracy, and Democracy.

Question 2.

Are there any of these simple Forms perfect?

Answer.

All these have their particular Conveniences and Inconveniences.

Observation 1.

Experience hath taught Men every where to acknowledge this, and accordingly there never was long (if at all) continued any of these Forms exactly simple; tho' some have seemed more such than others. Also in all Mixtures there is commonly some one of these Forms more conspicuous than the rest, from whence such a particular Government hath its Denomination.

Question 3.

Is the State of England governed by any one of these kinds simply?

Answer.

(3)

Answer.

The Experience and Wisdom of your Ancestors hath moulded this Government out of a Mixture of these.

Question 4.

What kind of Government then is that of the State of *England*?

Answer.

A Regulated Monarchy.

Observation 1.

If this Government be a Mixture of all these, and a regulated Monarchy; then it is a fond thing of us to talk of an absolute Monarchy, and what an absolute Monarch is, or may do. And it is only the Language of Flattery that holds such Discourses.

2. It need not be counted a Solecism (as some would persuade us) to speak of Free Subjects in a Monarchy, especially such a Monarchy as ours is.

3. If this Government be a Mixture of all three, then the House of Commons, the representative Body of the People, must needs be allowed a Share in Government (some at least) which yet is denied.

4. If this Government be a Mixture, then is not the Government, according to these Laws, solely trusted to the King, as seems to be affirmed.

5. If the Government be regulated, why do Men tell us that the King is above all Law; for it is by Laws that he is regulated.

6. If the King be regulated by the Law, then is the King accountable to the Law, and not to God only, as Men would make us believe.

7. If the Monarchy or regal Authority itself be regulated, then whatsoever is done by the King, undeniably without and beyond the

the Limitations of that Regulation, is not regal Authority. And therefore,

8. To resist the notorious Transgressions of that Regulation, is no resisting of regal Authority. And

9. It is so far from being a resisting of the Ordinance of God, that it is not so much as resisting the Ordinance of Man.

Question 5.

By whom was this Government framed in this Sort? Or who is to be accounted the immediate Efficient of the Constitution thereof?

Answer.

The Experience and Wisdom of your Ancestors hath so moulded this.

Observation 1.

If our Ancestors were the Moulders of this Government, then the King hath not his Power, solely

solely or immediately, by divine Right.

2. Much less hath he his Power or Authority by Right of Conquest.

3. But the immediate Original of it was from the People. And if so, Then——

4. In questioned Cases, the King is to produce his Grant (for he hath no more than what was granted) and not the People to shew a Reservation; for all is presumed to be reserved, which cannot be proved to be granted away.

Question 6.

Is this regulated and mixt Monarchy, as good as an absolute Monarchy, or better, or worse?

Answer.

The excellent Constitution of this Kingdom, (the antient, equal, happy, well-poised, and never-enough-commended Constitution of the Government of this Kingdom,) hath made this Nation

tion so many Years both famous and happy, and to a great Degree of Envy.

Question 7.

How comes it to pass that this Constitution is so excellent ?

Answer.

The Experience and Wisdom of our Ancestors hath so moulded this, out of a Mixture of these, as to give to this Kingdom, (as far as human Prudence can provide) the Conveniences of all three, without the Inconvenience of any one.

Observation 1.

Then those who would place in the King, an absolute and arbitrary Power to do what he list, are destructive to the Nation's Happiness, and Enemies to the Kingdom.

2. If this Mixture cause this Happiness, then it is not the Greatness of the King's Power over his People,

People, but the Restraint of that Power which hath made this Kingdom famous and happy; for other Kings have Power as large, but not so much restrained; which Largeness of their Power hath raised those Kings indeed, (but not their Kingdoms) to a great Degree of Envy.

3. Hence we discern, that it is possible for Kings to envy their People's Happiness, because the Largeness of the People's Happiness depends much upon the Restraint of the King's exorbitant Power.

4. If this Mixture and well-poised Constitution have raised this Kingdom to so great a Degree of Envy, no Marvel if Jesuitical Counsels be active to over-throw this happy Constitution.

Question 8.

What is the Conveniency or Good of Monarchy?

Answer.

Answer.

The uniting of a Nation under one Head, to resist Invasion from abroad, and Infurrection at home.

Observation 1.

What pernicious Counsellors are they then to a Monarch who advise him to bring in Forces from abroad, or keep up a standing-Army at home, fit out a Naval Armament, and yet let *Spanish* Ships seize upon his Merchants, which is so formally contrary to the proper Good or End of Monarchy itself?

2. Or are they better or worse who advise him to authorize, or even permit any in his Name to plunder, rob, spoil, imprison any of his Subjects, whom they have found peaceably in their Houses, or at work in the Fields, and have not disobeyed any legal Command of his?

C

Question

Question 9.

What is the Ill of absolute Monarchy? Or the Inconvenience to which it is liable?

Answer.

The Ill of absolute Monarchy, is Tyranny.

Observation 1.

Therefore the more absolute a Monarch is, the more prone to be a Tyrant.

2. Therefore also it is safer to restrain the King of some Power to do us good, then to grant him too much Opportunity to do us hurt; and the Danger is greater to the People in enlarging the King's Power, than restraining it somewhat.

Question 10.

What is the Good or Convenience of Aristocracy.

Answer.

The Good of Aristocracy is the Conjunction of Counsels in the ablest

ablest Persons of a State for public Benefit.

Observation 1.

Then surely it is for the public Benefit of the State, that this Conjunction of Counsels in Parliament should be made use of more than once in thirteen or fourteen Years ; and the Law for a triennial Parliament (if there were not others before for the holding of a Parliament yearly) was a most necessary Law, as also that it should not be dissolved for fifty Days.

2. It was not then intended in the Constitution of this Government, that the King in the greatest Matters of Importance for public Benefit, should only hear what they say, and then follow it or reject it merely at his own Pleasure ; for this may be as well done in an absolute Monarchy.

3. Neither is it agreeable to the Constitution of this Kingdom, to

withdraw the King from affording his Presence to his great Counsel of State, that so the private Counsels of private Men may be preferred before those whom the Law and the Constitution of the Kingdom counts the ablest to judge of public Benefit.

Question II.

What is the Ill of Aristocracy, or the Inconvenience to which it is liable?

Answer.

The Ill of Aristocracy is Faction and Division.

Observation.

What shall we say then to those private Counsellors who have abused the King, by persuading him first to withdraw himself from his Parliament, and then to call away the Members of both Houses, when yet without the Consent of both Houses this Parliament cannot be adjourned to another Place,
much

much less dissolved? Yet if all would have come away at Call, had it not been dissolved for want of legal Numbers remaining? And what greater Faction or Division can there be, than such as divide between King and Parliament, and between the House and their Members? Are not they most pernicious Instruments, who make Monarchy itself (whose End is to unite as was said before) thus far guilty of Faction and Division?

Question 12.

What is the Good, or Convenience of Democracy?

Answer.

The Good of Democracy is Liberty, and the Courage and Industry which Liberty begets.

Observation 1.

Then the more Liberties are encroached upon, the more the People will be rendered cowardly and poor, as may be plain enough seen
by

by comparing the Valour and Riches of this Nation in Queen *Elizabeth's* Days, with what hath been of late Days.

2. The King himself, when once his Subjects, by having lost their Liberties, shall lose withal their Courages, will prove the greatest Loser; for then his Kingdom will be an easy Prey to any foreign Invader, or even to a homebred Ufurper, that could gather any sudden Strength, and would promise more Liberty.

Question 13.

What is the Ill of Democracy, or the Inconvenience to which it is liable?

Answer.

The Ills of Democracy are Tumults, Violence, and Licentiousness.

Observation.

If these be the Evils for which the People's Liberty ought to be restrained

restrained by the Mixture in this Government, then the Restraint of the Liberty should be measured according to the Exigency of these Evils, and so much Liberty need only be restrained as is sufficient for the Prevention of these Evils.

Question 14.

What is the Mixture of this Kingdom, which gives it the Conveniences of all the three fore-mentioned kinds of Government, without the Inconveniencies of any one.

Answer.

In this Kingdom the Laws are jointly made by a King, by a House of Peers, and by a House of Commons chosen by the People: All having free Votes, and particular Privileges.

Observation 1.

Whereas there hath been great Question made by many, what is meant by the Power and Privileges

leges of Parliament, mentioned in the Protestation, which hath been so generally made throughout the Kingdom? There is no Reason to doubt but those Things which the King grants afterward, to be the particular Privilege of each House, and of both, are their certain Privileges according to Law, and the Constitution of the Kingdom; and to the maintaining of them every one that hath made the Protestation is most strictly bound, without Peradventure or Shift.

2. That the Privileges which the King challenges to himself, are to be yielded to, only so far forth as they are consistent with the acknowledged Privileges of the two Houses; because the Monarchy being acknowledged to be a regulated Monarchy, and the Government mixt of Aristocracy and Democracy, as well a Monarchy,

narchy ; it is the Privileges of the two Houses of Parliament that makes the Mixture, and so they must regulate and interpret the Privileges of the King, and not the Privileges of the King regulate or interpret theirs, save only to the maintaining still the Regal Dignity, and the Succession according to Laws.

Question 15.
What Privileges doth the King challenge to himself ?

Answer.

The Government according to these Laws is trusted to the King : Power of Treaties of War and Peace, of making Peers, of chusing Officers, and Counsellors for State, Judges for Law, Commanders for Forts and Castles ; giving Commissions for raising Men to make War Abroad, or to prevent or provide against Invasions and Insurrections at Home ; Benefit of

Confiscations, Power of pardoning, and some other of the like Kind are placed in the King.

Observation I.

That all these are ordinarily in the King, Experience and Custom teaches, even those who know not the Laws by Reading; but by what hath been noted before, and follows after, it is to be understood only so, as not to prejudice the Privileges of the Houses of Parliament, especially in Cases of Necessity, (of which hereafter.)

Also—

2. It is acknowledged here, that the Government, trusted, is to be according to the Laws, and so all these Things are not absolutely in the King; as for Instance, Pardons, the Law denies Power of Pardoning wilful Murther; and Benefit of some Confiscations belongs to some private Lords of Manors.

3. If

3. If Government only according to Law be trusted to the King, then to resist notorious illegal Violences is not to resist the King's Authority.

Question 16.

For what End is this Authority trusted to the King, and placed in him ?

Answer.

For our Subjects Sake these Rights are vested in us. The Prince may not make use of this high and perpetual Power to the Hurt of those for whose Good he hath it.

Observation 1.

Then the Good of the Subjects is ever to be preferred before the Monarchial Greatness of the King (the End is ever more considerable than the Means) *Salus Populi is suprema Lex.*

2. Whosoever counsels the King to any Thing against the Good of

his Subjects, is the King's Enemy, as well as the Commonwealths; by attempting to turn him from that which is the End of his Authority.

Question 17.

To what Purpose especially are the Privileges of the House of Commons and the House of Peers?

Answer.

That the Prince may not make use of this high and perpetual Power to the Hurt of those for whose Good he hath it; and make use of the Name of Publick Necessity for the Gain of his private Favourites and Followers, &c.

Observation 1.

The Law then supposes, that such Cases may fall out, though it then charge the Blame upon those Favourites and Followers, and not upon the King (as we shall see presently.)

2. We

2. We need not wonder then why private Favourites and Followers are such Enemies to Parliaments and their Privileges, which are on purpose to hinder their Gains: Of which also more anon.

3. The two Houses are by the Law, it seems, to be trusted, when they declare, that Royal Power is made use of for the Hurt of the People; and the Name of Publick Necessity made use of for the Gain of private Favourites and Followers, and the like.

Question 18.

What are the special Privileges of the House of Commons towards this?

Answer.

The House of Commons, an excellent Conserver of Liberty—is solely intrusted with the first Propositions concerning the Levies of Monies, which are the Sin-

news

news as well of Peace as of War,
&c.

Observation 1.

It seems then the House of Commons is presumed to be more careful for the Subjects Liberties, than either the King, or the House of Peers.

2. Then it must needs be strange for any to conceive (when the King's Declarations should persuade) that the House of Commons would fight against and subvert the Liberty and Property of the Subject, and the King's Favourites and Followers fight for them and protect them.

3. Then no Monies may be levied, neither for Peace nor War, no not under Pretence of Publick Necessity, (as EXCISES were proposed, tho' happily frustrated.)

4. If

4. If the House of Commons be an excellent Conserver of Liberty it must needs have some Power in some Cases to levy Money even without the King's Consent; or else it will be utterly impossible to conserve Liberty at all. Of which likewise more anon.

Question 19.

But if the King's private Favourites and Followers have actually persuaded him to any Thing against the Laws and Liberties of the Subject, with what farther Privilege is the House of Commons intrusted towards the conserving of Liberty?

Answer.

With the Impeaching of those, who for their own Ends, though countenanced by any surreptitiously-gotten Command of the King, have violated that Law, which he is bound (when he knows it) to protect! and to the Protection of which

which they were bound to advise him, at least not to serve him in the contrary.

Observation 1.

Then it is no Excuse to any that violate the Laws, that they serve the King in so doing.

2. The Law counts all Commands from the King, which are any way contrary to the Law, surreptitiously gotten.

3. Then the Parliament speaks according to the Law, when they constantly lay the Blame of all Violations upon the King's Favourites and Followers, and their getting surreptitiously Commands from him, and not upon the King himself.

4. No Command of the King is to hinder the Commons from impeaching such as have violated the Law.

5. The King is bound not to protect any of his Followers and
Fa-

Favourites against the Commons Impeachment of them; because he knows and affirms, that he is bound to protect the Laws, and that this is the Law, that the Commons are to impeach such,

Question 20.

What is the special Privilege of the House of Peers in former Cases of such Favourites and Followers of our Kings as are impeached by the Commons? and so to decide all Matters in Question between the King and the People?

Answer.

The Lords being trusted with a Judicatory Power, are an excellent Screen and Bulwark between the Prince and the People, to assist each against any Incroachments of the other, and by just Judgments preserve the Law, which ought to be the Rule of every one of the Three.

E

Question

Question 21.

But have the Two Houses Power to put their Judgments into Execution, as well as to impeach and judge?

Answer.

The Power of Punishment is already in your Hands according to Law.

Observation 1.

Again it is no Wonder that the King's Favourites and Followers hate Parliaments, (who not only hinder their Gain, but have Power to punish them) when they have violated the Laws.

2. Then the Lords (and much more the Two Houses together) are supreme Judges of all Matters in Difference between the King and the People, and have Power to prevent all the King's Incroachments upon the People, as well as the People's upon Him.

3. The

3. The King is bound to protect any whom the Lords, upon the Impeachment of the Commons, have judged Delinquents; for he hath granted, that he is bound to protect the Law; and that according to Law the Power of punishing (even of his Favourites and Followers, before spoken of) is in their Hands, but they cannot punish them, so long as he protects them.

4. Then the Law allows them, as the supreme Judicatory (even that which must be a Screen between the King and the People, and assist the People against the King's Incroachments, and punish the King's Favourites and Followers, though countenanced by surreptitiously-gotten Commands from the King) a Power to bring such as they have judged, (or are to judge) to condign Punishment, which is granted to all inferior

Judges, in their Circuits and Jurisdictions.

5. Then if those Delinquents get the King to protect them, or surreptitiously get Commands of him, to raise Arms to shelter themselves against the Judgment of the two Houses; the two Houses have Power by the Law to raise not only the *Posse Comitatus* (of those Counties where such Delinquents are, to apprehend them, but also the *Posse Regni*, the Power of the whole Kingdom, if need be; or else the Power of Punishment is not in their Hands according to Law, and it would be safer contemning and scorning and opposing the highest Judicatory, the Parliament, than any inferior Court, a Judge of Assize, or the like: And they that could get Commands to violate the Law before, would easily get Protection against the Parliament when they

they are questioned, if the Parliament had no Power to raise Arms to suppress them.

Question 22.

But if there be an Attempt on Danger, that the King's Favourites and Followers go about to change this regulated Monarchy into an arbitrary Government, and so into a Tyranny; is there Authority in the Houses sufficient, according to what was fore-mentioned, to Remedy this?

Answer.

A Power legally placed in both Houses is more than sufficient to prevent and restrain the Power of Tyranny.

Observation 1.

Then at least whatever Power is necessary to prevent or restrain the Power of Tyranny, is confessed to be legally placed in both Houses; for else there is not Power sufficient,

ent, much less, more than sufficient.

2. Then it is lawful for the two Houses to raise Arms to defend themselves, in case an Army be raised against them ; for else they have not Power sufficient to restrain the Power of Tyranny. There is no greater Attempt of Tyranny than to raise Arms against the Houses of Parliament ; and there is no way to restrain this Tyranny, but by raising Arms in their own Defence : Less than this cannot be sufficient.

3. If a legal Power be placed in them, not only to restrain, but prevent the Power of Tyranny, then they are the legal Judges, when there is Danger of Tyranny ; and they have legal Power to command their Judgment to be obeyed, for Prevention as well as Restraint of Tyranny.

4. Then

4. Then it is lawful for them to provide for their own and the Kingdom's Safety, and they have legal Power to command the People to this Purpose; not only when Arms are actually raised against them, but when they discern, and accordingly declare a Preparation made towards it: For if they let alone altogether the Exercise of their Power, till Arms are actually raised against them; they may in all likelihood find it too late, not only to prevent, but even to restrain the Power of Tyranny.

5. Then they have legal Power, in such Times of Danger, to put into safe Hands, such Forts, Ports, Magazines, Ships, and Power of the Militia, as are intended, or likely to be intended, to introduce a Tyranny; for else they cannot have Power sufficient to prevent or restrain the Power of Tyranny.

6. Then

6. Then they have legal Power to levy Monies, Arms, Horses, Ammunition, upon the Subjects, in such Cases of Danger, even without or against the King's Consent; for it cannot be imagined that in such Cases when the King's Favourites and Followers have gotten Commands from him, to protect them in their Delinquencies, and Attempts to introduce Tyranny, that ever he will consent to Levies of Monies against those Favourites and Followers of his, or to the raising Arms against them, especially he being still in their Hands, and among them, and not with his Parliament; and without such Levies of Monies, &c. it is not possible for the Two Houses of Parliament, to prevent or restrain sufficiently the Power of Tyranny.

7. They who have made the Protests, to maintain and defend

Defend the Power and Privileges of Parliament, may see in all these Things (acknowledged by the King, and clearly following from his Acknowledgments) what is that Power, and what are the Privileges of Parliament, which they have so solemnly, in the Presence of Almighty God, vowed, promised, and protested to maintain, &c.

8. And finally, since the Two Houses of Parliament have so often and fully declared their Intentions in settling the Militia, augment our Naval Force, securing our Trade, and last of all, levying Monies by voluntary Contributions and Assessments; they have only used that legal Power which is in them for the Punishment of Delinquents, and for the Prevention and Restraint of the Power of Tyranny, of all which they are the legal Judges;

F and

and all the Subjects of this Kingdom are bound by the Laws to obey them herein, and those doubly bound who have made the late Proteftations.

GOD SAVE THE KING.



Machiavel's G H O S T,

A

S A T I R E.

Machine's G H O S T

A

S A T I R E



NICHOLAS MACHIAVEL

To his Most-beloved

Ministerial Sons.



AND why dear Off-spring should
you fear to fall,
When you approach to Tryal,
since you all
Can with bold Faces firmly stand the Test,
And on your Innocence securely rest?
Void of all Blame, and spite of Envy, be
As free from Punishment as Honesty.
Who dares distrust my Darlings, or compel
Before their Times to take their Thrones
in Hell?

Who

Who can convert your Meanings for the
Good

O'th' Public-Weal to Bad? Since what
you would

Have bravely acted, was t'increase the Store
O'th' Kingdom, and your own Wealth
ten Times more.

Sweet Sons of Policy, whose glorious
Train

Flow like *Minerva* from my *Jove*-like
Brain;

Why should your Actions suffer Censure,
when

You are indeed the only Men of Men,
That do with cautious Industry supply
Nature's Defects; and to Monopoly
Reduce all Trades, and Sciences within
The Kingdom, from the Bever to the Pin?
With what a Care of Soberness do you
Inhance the Price of Wine, and make
Men brew

By Licence only? Not the Coals, or Salt,
But are excis'd; Spirits, and Oil of Malt;
Nay, e'en our Rag-Merchants their Tri-
bute pay,

Tobacco too, and ev'ry Thing that lay
Open

Open to your Inventions: Cards and Dice,
Laying an Imposition on Men's Vice.

Just so in *Rome*, where they do strive to
win

Poor-Souls, they raise a Profit out of Sin:
And to augment the holy Father's Store,
Inflict a set Rate on each public Whore.

Such a fine quaint Invention, such a Reach
Have your *Ætherial* Fancies, as would teach
Furies themselves new Arts: And why
then shou'd

You the Grand Patriots of the Public
Good,

Suffer or Shame, or Punishment; debarr'd
Your Liberty, when you deserve Reward?
Which you shall have, triumphantly to deck
Like a fair Chain, each One's well-fashion'd
Neck.

Nor shall *Tyburnian*-Magistrate with Stroke
Of paultry Penny-Cord have Pow'r to
choke

Weafons so meritorious: You shall shine
Still in your Orbs, bright Stars, and ne'er
pay Fine

Able

Able to break an Alderman ; should you
Suffer, your Punishment kills Virtue too.
But to encourage you, dear Children, look
On my last Legacy, this Little-Book,

Which reeking wet now from the Press
does shew,

(Perhaps what others scarce before did
know)

Your noble Quality, how just, how true

You are to th' State, what Methods you
pursue,

For your own Profits. So dear Sons
Farewel,

Ere long I hope to welcome you to Hell.

Hark, the Cock crows !

Machiavel vanishes.



